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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2007, two law professors made a splash by proposing the
creation of a "national security court." Professors Jack Goldsmith and Neal Ka-
tyal, the former having served in the Bush Administration's Office of Legal
Counsel, and the latter now serving in the Solicitor General's Office of the Ob-
ama Administration, proposed a "Congressionally sanctioned system of preven-
tive detention."' Article III judges would determine whether the government
had a valid rationale for detention in each case brought before them. Congress
would define who counts as an "enemy," and it would create rules for the han-
dling of classified evidence and other procedural details. The system would be
"comprehensive."2 Goldsmith and Katyal's proposal garnered considerable crit-
icism from civil libertarians, who worried that the creation of a parallel justice
system was unnecessary and potentially dangerous.'
Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2o11; Yale University, B.A. 2007. I would like to
thank Sara Solow, Grant Martinez, and Bruce Ackerman for their valuable com-
ments and insights. I also would like to thank the journalists at Pro Publica for
maintaining an excellent and timely database on all of the Guantdnamo habeas
decisions.
1. Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2007, at A19.
2. Id.; see also BENJAMIN WITTEs, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUS-
TICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 162-66 (2008) (arguing that Congress should create
national security courts through an explicit statutory scheme); Andrew C. McCar-
thy & Alykhan Velshi, Outsourcing American Law: We Need a National Security
Court i (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 156, 2009), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20o9o82o-Chapter6.pdf (same).
3. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer & Ben Wizner, Don't Replace the Old Guantdnamo with a
New One, SALON, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/
20o8/12/og/guantanamo/print.html; Michael Ratner, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A12 ("The idea of making this [preventive detention] sys-
tem permanent and more acceptable by adding some bells and whistles-a special
national security court-is going in the wrong direction.").
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Of course, Congress has passed no such law, and the Obama Administra-
tion indicated last fall that it would not seek new legislation to this effect.4 In-
stead, the Department of Justice released a statement that, in continuing to de-
tain individuals held at Guantdnamo Bay, it would rely on "authority already
provided by Congress" in the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), passed in the immediate wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.5
While the AUMF does not mention detention specifically, the Supreme Court
held in 2004 that it includes the power to detain certain types of combatants in
Harmdi v. Rumsfeld.6 Four years later, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court held
that all detainees in Guantinamo Bay have a constitutional right to petition for
writs of habeas corpus.
7
Hamdi and Boumediene have spawned an entirely new area of federal
common law: the common law of preventive detention. In articulating the
broad outlines of a government power (detention) and a process of review (ha-
beas proceedings), the Supreme Court specifically gave trial courts discretion to
determine the exact contours of detention authority on a case-by-case basis.
Dozens of such habeas cases now have been channeled to the D.C. district
court, and since the fall of 2008, the judges on that court have released a flurry
of rulings accepting or rejecting detainees' petitions. Although many civil liber-
tarians have found comfort in the fact that a majority of these petitions were
granted, they have missed the forest for the trees. The D.C. district court is per-
forming essentially the same "national security court" task that Goldsmith and
others proposed as a pipe dream for new legislation.8 That is, the district court
judges are operating under a framework that allows the government to detain
individuals indefinitely, without trial, and subject to review under relaxed evi-
dentiary and procedural standards.
This Comment argues that, less than two years after Boumediene, the D.C.
district court's habeas jurisprudence has, through a common law process, con-
structed the national security court that was so controversial as a policy pro-
posal. This jurisprudence recently was crystallized and substantially sharpened
4. Peter Baker, Obama To Use Current Law To Support Detentions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2009, at A23.
5. Id.
6. 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
7. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
8. Goldsmith, in fact, now considers the question of whether we should have a na-
tional security court to be essentially moot. Instead, he confines his latest argu-
ments to urging that Congress settle some of the finer details. Jack Goldsmith,
Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court 6-8 (Feb. 4,
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review). Gold-
smith argues that a de facto national security court has essentially existed in the
District of Columbia ever since federal courts moved to consolidate habeas cases
there in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004). See Goldsmith, supra, at 6-8.
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in the first appellate ruling on post-Boumediene habeas cases: the D.C. Circuit's
Al-Bihani v. Obama decision. 9 Though much has been written about the general
legal problems regarding preventive detention, ° few have addressed the con-
tours of the detention system that now exists in our courts." Because much of
this important new policymaking has occurred through trial courts, one aim of
this Comment is simply to elucidate some of the key holdings of the federal dis-
trict judges, in the hope that greater transparency will facilitate more fruitful di-
alogue. Part I thus examines the substance of the D.C. district court's rulings on
habeas petitions and detention authority and the recent ruling issued by the
D.C. Circuit in Al-Bihani. Part II discusses why civil libertarians' apparent satis-
faction with many of the rulings so far is misplaced, in that it ignores the courts'
underlying expansion of the President's detention authority.'2 Part III argues
that a common law route is particularly problematic in the detention context,
drawing current policy implications from the D.C. district court habeas rulings
and concluding that the D.C. Circuit should have taken a far more minimalist
approach in its recent A1-Bihani decision.
9. 59o F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2olo).
io. Some of the most recent influential scholarship includes Douglass Cassel, Pretrial
and Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Options and Constraints Under In-
ternational Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (20o8); Robert M. Chesney,
Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention Debate, 50 S. TEx. L.
REV. 669 (2009); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Conver-
gence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 6o STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008);
David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and
War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693 (2009); Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in
Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 403 (2009); and Matthew C. Waxman,
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terror-
ists, 1O8 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008).
11. One important exception is a comprehensive review of the habeas rulings recently
written by Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney, and Rabea Benhalim from the
Brookings Institution. Their study closely surveys the terrain of the D.C. habeas
decisions, but it focuses more on the specific issues that have divided the judges
than on their broader areas of consensus within the context of public debate. See
BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, BROOKINGS INST.,
THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTkNAMO HABEAS CASES AS
LAWMAKING (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/
papers/2010/0122_guantanamo wittes.chesney/o122_guantanamo witteschesney
.pdf.
12. This Comment does not argue for any particular interpretation of the AUMF and
does not tackle the broader legality and constitutionality of preventive detention.
Rather, it addresses the second-order topic of how these decisions actually have
been made and what they have said, sketching potential policy ramifications and
concerns.
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I. THE RULINGS So FAR
Between the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene, which held that
Guantinamo detainees are entitled to petition for writs of habeas corpus, up
until the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Al-Bihani, the D.C. district court issued sixteen
publicly available rulings granting or denying such petitioners' cases on the me-
rits, and three additional decisions setting standards as to whom the govern-
ment may detain.13 These decisions contain both colorful disagreements and
crucial points of convergence, and their key holdings are discussed in Section
L.A below. Section I.B then discusses the D.C. Circuit's recent Al-Bihani opin-
ion, which crystallized and substantially sharpened some of the district court's
holdings. The common law path from the district court rulings through the re-
cent appellate ruling shows a growing acceptance and normalization of preven-
tive detention authority-even in cases where the courts have ordered the re-
lease of detainees.
A. June 12, 2008 - January5, 2010
The district court decisions have addressed a complex range of issues, from
the definition of an "enemy combatant" and the criteria for detention to the
types of evidence the government may use and the degree of deference to such
evidence that will be afforded by the courts. While this Comment explores some
of the points of contention in the D.C. district court opinions, it also demon-
strates an important point of convergence. Namely, each judge to have decided
13. Some of these cases have involved multiple detainees, while others have not been
cited because the substantive opinions are still undergoing declassification review.
See Hatim v. Obama, No. 05-1429, 2009 WL 5191429 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2009); Al
Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Odah v. United
States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009); Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280 (GK),
2009 WL 2584685 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009); Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20
(D.D.C. 2009); Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009); Al
Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009); Mattan v. Obama, 618 F.
Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2009); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009);
Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.
Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2009);
Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Bihani v. Obama,
594 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2009); El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C.
2009); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2008); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F.
Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d
33 (D.D.C. 20o8), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir.
2009), cert granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191
(D.D.C. 20o8). For additional and updated sources on Guantdnamo habeas cases,
see also Pro Publica, Dig into the Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits,
http://www.propublica.org/special/an-examination-of-31-gitmo-detainee-lawsuits
-722 (last visited July 1, 2010); and Center for Constitutional Rights, Guantanamo
Habeas Decision Scorecard, http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/guantanamo-
bay-habeas-decision-scorecard (last visited July 1, 2010).
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a habeas appeal has done so within a general framework that authorizes long-
term preventive detention, as long as the government can show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that an individual is (or was) a member of al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces. Moreover, the district court judges have more or
less uniformly followed a set of unique, judicially crafted procedures tailored to
the habeas cases.
14
Once Boumediene was handed down, the most central issue that the D.C.
district court judges had to decide is whom, exactly, the government is allowed
to detain. The Court had stated in Hamdi that the "permissible bounds" of the
category would be "defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are pre-
sented to them"'5-a sentiment reiterated in Boumediene.6 Prior to the D.C.
Circuit's January 5 ruling in Al-Bihani, seven judges on the D.C. district court
had opined on this question and had in part or in whole agreed with the Obama
Administration's position. The Obama Administration maintains that the
AUMF permits the President to detain: (i) individuals who had involvement in
the 9/11 terrorist attacks (with language almost identical to the AUMF); and (2)
"persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or [al-Qaedal
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners."17 By the time of the D.C. Circuit ruling, three of
the D.C. district court judges had adopted this reading wholesale, while four
had eliminated the "substantially supported" prong. 8
Every judge who has considered the matter has agreed that the AUMF au-
thorizes the President to detain those who are (or were) part of the Taliban, al-
Qaeda, or associated forces. The first judge to discuss the issue at length was
14. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
15. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004).
16. Though not touching directly upon the question of who is detainable, the Court
in Boumediene left the habeas courts free to make procedural "innovation[s] in
the field of habeas corpus." Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008).
17. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay De-
tainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) (Misc. No. o8-0442 (TFH)) [herein-
after Government Memorandum]. The Obama Administration has dropped the
term "enemy combatant" but argues that essentially the same set of persons de-
fined by the Bush Administration are detainable. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.
Supp. 2d 43, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2009).
18. Compare Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-28o (GK), 2009 WL 2584685 (D.D.C. Aug.
21, 2009) (Judge Kessler), Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009)
(Judge Walton), and Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge
Leon, accepting the Bush Administration's earlier definition of an "enemy com-
batant"), with Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Robert-
son), Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Kollar-
Kotelly), Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Lamberth),
and Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (Judge Bates).
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Judge Reggie Walton, in Gherebi v. Obama.'9 In a lengthy opinion that drew ex-
tensively on sources ranging from the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdi to the
Geneva Conventions, Judge Walton concluded that the AUMF and the laws of
war support the President's authority to detain enemy forces during an armed
conflict. He agreed with the government that an armed conflict against the Ta-
liban, al-Qaeda, and their associated forces is ongoing and that members of
these forces therefore are detainable. He also adopted the "substantially sup-
ported" prong of the government's argument." Judge Walton's analysis was
adopted by Judge Gladys Kessler' and more or less endorsed by Judge Richard
Leon in an earlier ruling." Judge John Bates, on the other hand, rejected the
"substantially supported" clause of the government's definition in Hamlily v.
Obama, holding that the court could find "no authority in domestic law or the
law of war, nor can the government point to any, to justify the concept of 'sup-
port' as a valid ground for detention" 3-a conclusion signed on to by three ad-
ditional district judges.
2 4
Another salient issue among the D.C. judges was whether the government
must show that a petitioner now meets the AUMF detention criteria, or only
that he once did. In Basardh v. Obama, Judge Ellen Huvelle, citing the AUMF's
stated purpose of preventing future attacks, concluded that the statute "does
not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to
prevent those individuals from rejoining the battle" and, therefore, that the
question at hand is whether the petitioner continues to pose a threat to the
United States.2 Judge Leon reached a similar conclusion in Al Ginco v. Obama,
a case in which the petitioner actually was "imprisoned [and] tortured" by al-
Qaeda and the Taliban before being taken into U.S. custody. 6 Concluding that
the government's position "defie[d] common sense," Judge Leon stated that a
prior relationship with enemy forces clearly can be "vitiated by the passage of
time, intervening events, or both."2 7 The opposite conclusion, however, was
reached by Judge James Robertson in Awad v. Obama,s in which he acknowl-
edged Judge Huvelle's argument in Basardh but declined to follow it. Instead,
19. 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009).
20. Id. at 69.
21. Al-Adahi, 2009 WL 2584685, at *3.
22. See AI-Bihani, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (observing that "helping to prepare the meals
of [an] entire [al-Qaeda] fighting force is more than sufficient 'support' to meet
this Court's definition").
23. 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2009).
24. See sources cited supra note 18 (Awad; Al Mutairi; and Mattan).
25. Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009).
26. 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D.D.C. 2009).
27. Id. at 128.
28. 646 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2009).
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he commented: "It seems ludicrous to believe that [Awad] poses a security
threat now, but that is not for me to decide."
29
Perhaps equally important to deciding the issue of who is detainable, the
D.C. district judges also have created their own architecture for habeas proceed-
ings. Nearly every decision references a Case Management Order (CMO) issued
by Judge Thomas Hogan, under whom many of the habeas petitions were con-
solidated for procedural guidance. In the course of just six pages, Judge Hogan's
CMO set the ground rules for issues such as the government's disclosure obliga-
tions (all exculpatory evidence plus material generally relating to the govern-
ment's factual return); the handling of classified information (the government
must provide petitioners with adequate substitutes); the government's burden
of proof (preponderance of the evidence); the use of hearsay evidence (accept-
able if relevant and reliable and where providing a substitute poses an undue
burden); and the general framework under which evidentiary hearings would
proceed." The CMO is referenced throughout the D.C. district judges' habeas
decisions the way one might cite the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
1.3
B. Al-Bihani v. Obama
In Al-Bihani, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit reviewed the case of
Ghaleb Nassar AI-Bihani, a Yemeni national who was captured in Afghanistan
by the Northern Alliance and handed over to U.S. coalition forces in early
2002.32 The government contended during Al-Bihani's initial habeas proceeding
that he was "part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces" primarily on the
grounds that, as a member of the Fifty-Fifth Arab Brigade-a military unit that
fought alongside the Taliban-he supported both the Taliban and al-Qaeda in
their fight against Northern Alliance and U.S. forces.3 Al-Bihani admitted to
traveling to Afghanistan to join the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, but
he claimed that he was simply a cook for the Fifty-Fifth Brigade (and thus more
like a "civilian contractor" than a fighting member) and that he never took up
29. Id. at 24.
30. See Case Management Order, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp.
2d33 (D.D.C. 20o8) (Misc. No. 08-0442 (TFH)) [hereinafter CMO].
31. See, e.g., Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Under the
CMO, the Government bears the burden of proving, 'by a preponderance of the
evidence, the lawfulness of the petitioner's detention."') (quoting CMO, supra
note 30, I II.A).
32. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2OLO).
33. A/ Bihani, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 583
F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008) (mem.)). Al-Bihani conceded that the Fifty-
Fifth Arab Brigade fought with the Taliban, but he denied that it was commanded
by al-Qaeda personnel. See AI-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 885 n.1 (Williams, J., concur-
ring).
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arms against U.S. forces.3 4 His unit came under attack from the Northern Alli-
ance, and, after retreating alongside Taliban forces, he eventually was captured
and turned over to U.S. authorities. 5 Judge Leon, writing for the district court,
deemed this conduct sufficient to conclude that, more probably than not, Al-
Bihani was "part of or supporting" Taliban or al-Qaeda forces and denied his
habeas petition. 6
On appeal, Judge Janice Rogers Brown of the D.C. Circuit took the oppor-
tunity to paint with some broader strokes. Judge Brown's opinion for the court
first issued a sweeping statement that any argument premised on the assump-
tion that the AUMF was bounded by international laws of war was "mis-
taken." 7 She then concluded that anyone subject to military commission under
the Military Commissions Act-a statute pertaining to trial and punishment-
was necessarily subject to indefinite detention without trial as well. Thus, any-
one who has "'purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its co-belligerents [and] is not a lawful enemy combatant"'
could be detained 8 Additionally, Judge Brown noted that the government did
not have to prove that a detainee remains a threat to the United States; having
shown that an individual met the detention standards at the point of capture, it
could continue to hold him until "the fighting stops."39 On procedural ques-
tions as well, Judge Brown was highly deferential to the government. She took
the Supreme Court's statement in Boumediene, that habeas proceedings "need
not resemble a criminal trial," to mean that they need not resemble even post-
conviction review procedures.4 ' And in ratifying the district court's preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, Judge Brown mused that the court "need not ad-
dress" whether a lower standard of proof, such as "some evidence" or probable
cause, also could suffice.
4'
While the D.C. Circuit opinion in Al-Bihani was, in many ways, a harden-
ing or intensification of the district court's holdings, it is important to note the
broad cruxes of this common law body to which even the more liberal judges
adhere: The executive branch may indefinitely detain anyone who is part of the
34. Al Bihani, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
35. Id. at 39-40.
36. Judge Leon did not explicitly say whether his finding was based on the "part of"
prong or the "supported" prong, and did not make an overall assessment of the
government's claimed authority under the AUMF.
37. As pointed out in Judge Williams's concurring opinion, this conclusion is quite at
odds with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hamdi, i.e., that its understanding of
the AUMF was "'based on longstanding law-of-war principles."' AI-Bihani, 590
F.3d at 885 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)).
38. Id. at 872 (citing Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(A)(i)).
39. Id. at 874.
40. Id. at 876.
41. Id. at 878 n.4.
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Taliban, al-Qaeda, or associated forces without trial; the detainee need not have
engaged in any armed conflict, and could, conceivably, have been apprehended
anywhere in the world; and the procedures used to adjudge the detainee's fate
can be truncated along the lines of an administrative fact-finding. In short, the
core of the Goldsmith-Katyal proposal already has been enacted through the
judiciary.
II. FROM THE AUMF TO A NATIONAL SECURITY COURT
This entire legal regime, with its broad consensus on detention authority
and colorful disagreements on some of the details, relies almost singularly upon
a joint congressional resolution enacted just one week after the 9/11 attacks. But
the journey from the AUMF to this universe of preventive detention jurispru-
dence is riddled with uncertainties and conspicuously lacking in further legisla-
tive involvement. 4 Instead, it is a product of Congress's, both the Bush and Ob-
ama Administrations', and even the higher courts' de facto delegation (or
abdication) of authority to common law decision-making by lower courts. Al-
though the D.C. district court judges have dealt seriously and substantively with
many difficult legal and policy issues, the system they have built-whether it
actually is authorized under the AUMF or not-is a universe unto itself.
The AUMF authorizes the President to "use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons. .. ."4 The central ac-
tion that it enabled, of course, was the invasion of Afghanistan, and it was dur-
ing this invasion that individuals were captured and first brought to
Guantdnamo Bay.
The Supreme Court's 2004 holding in Hamdi v. Rurnsfeld" defined the
AUMF in two significant ways. First, it held as a general matter that an authori-
zation for force includes "the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant
conflict." 45 Second, the ruling widened the AUMF's scope from the 9/11 attacks
42. As noted above, the Military Commissions Act (MCA) speaks to the process for
trying and punishing combatants for past offenses-not to their indefinite deten-
tion without trial. Thus, the argument that the MCA constitutes "guidance" on
detention authority, see id. at 872, is somewhat of a stretch. The 2005 Detainee
Treatment Act arguably could be read as a legislative ratification of the executive's
practice of detention up to that point, but it contains no authorization for deten-
tion in itself, and neither the Obama Administration nor any of the habeas rulings
has relied on it for advancing detention authority arguments.
43. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). While the Bush Administration had also
claimed to have inherent detention authority under Article II of the Constitution,
see, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-17 (2004), the Obama Administra-
tion has not asserted this position.
44. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
45. Id. at 521.
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(the specific subject addressed in the resolution) to the larger global conflict be-
tween the United States and terrorist groups. Specifically, the Court held that
the government could detain a person who, for the purposes of the case, "was
'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners' in
Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States'
there."46 In other words, the Court defined detention authority in terms of mili-
tary opposition to the United States rather than in terms of direct involvement
in the 9/11 attacks.
The Obama Administration's current position is somewhat broader than
the holding in Hamdi. The Administration maintains that the President may
detain those involved with the 9/11 attacks and "persons who were part of, or
substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners."4 Thus,
persons detainable by the government need not have been involved in the 9/11
attacks and need not have engaged in any sort of battlefield activity, in Afghani-
stan or elsewhere. In other words, the "and who engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States [in Afghanistan]" clause has been stricken from the
Hamdi definition. Now, the detainable category conceivably would include
someone involved in a terror cell in India that loosely affiliates with al-Qaeda
and plots solely against the Indian government.
The Obama Administration's position has largely been ratified and en-
trenched by every habeas court to have heard it-even the ones that have
granted petitions for release. Each habeas ruling from the D.C. district court ac-
cepted that the AUMF authorizes preventive detention in the manner proposed
by the Obama Administration, with the only major disagreements involving the
"substantially supported" prong. Many of the habeas decisions, in fact, do not
contain government allegations that petitioners ever participated in armed con-
flict. Instead, the government argues that petitioners are (more likely than not)
part of al-Qaeda or the Taliban, based on a host of claims that usually involve
suspicious travel into Afghanistan and stays at suspect guesthouses. 4s The D.C.
46. Id. at 516 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No.
03-6696)) (emphasis added).
47. Government Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis added). This position is
almost identical to that taken by the Bush Administration. See, e.g., Boumediene
v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating and adopting the Bush Ad-
ministration's position).
48. For example, Judge Kessler's opinion in Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51
(D.D.C. 2009), which was widely hailed as a sharp rebuke to the government's po-
sitions, nonetheless accepted the key premise of the government's asserted deten-
tion authority and did not see armed engagement as a necessary premise for de-
tention; after dismissing the allegation that the petitioner had engaged in battle,
she went on to consider the various charges relating to his travels in Afghanistan.
Id. at 54, 59-66. For sources praising the ruling as a victory against the govern-
ment, see, for example, Andy Worthington, Judge Gladys Kessler Releases Yemeni
Detainee, Slams "Mosaic" of Guantanamo Intelligence and Unreliable Witnesses,
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district judges have rejected claims that truly are unsupportable by the evidence,
but the extensive framework stands. A1-Qaeda and Taliban members and their
affiliates are detainable in Guantdnamo Bay, possibly until they die there,
whether or not they have engaged in armed conflict against the United States.
III. THE PITFALLS OF A COMMON LAW PATH
It may indeed be wise as a matter of policy to detain al-Qaeda and Taliban
members indefinitely without charges. Congress, however, has failed to act (ei-
ther by codifying preventive detention or ending it), and the Supreme Court
has been unwilling to articulate the scope of the AUMF's detention authority in
Hamdi or any of its subsequent rulings. The President's stated position, mean-
while, has been articulated not as a matter of open policy, but rather as a legal
opinion adopted by the Justice Department in a somewhat obscure court fil-
ing.49
Thus, the D.C. district court judges have been facing, case by case, petition-
ers who have been detained for several years and have been tasked with deter-
mining whether they are still detainable. They arguably have come up with rea-
sonable answers to many difficult questions. But the most important
question-whether we ought to (or constitutionally can) maintain preventive
detention of persons who, unlike Mr. Hamdi, never were engaged in any battle-
field hostilities-is no longer asked. It seemingly has been answered, not by leg-
islation or even by a higher court ruling, but as a matter of common law juris-
prudence in the months and years following Boumediene.
5°
Moreover, absolutely nothing in any of the D.C. habeas opinions suggests
that the government must or should refrain from capturing additional detain-
ees, who never will stand trial in criminal court, and transferring them to long-
term preventive detention facilities. While the rulings at hand all deal with de-
tainees captured abroad several years ago under President Bush and brought to
a facility that President Obama intends to close, their scope has not been con-
fined to the current Guantdnamo population. To the contrary, the rulings may
suggest that the government is free to capture and preventively detain any addi-
tional individuals who are part of (or who substantially support) Taliban or al-
Qaeda forces, or any group that associates with them. It is no surprise, then,
that many have called for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the man who at-
HUFFINGTON POST, May 14, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy
-worthington/judge-condemns-mosaic-of b_2o3382.html.
49. See Government Memorandum, supra note 17.
50. The D.C. judges have, in fact, all but begged Congress to act. See A1-Bihani v. Ob-
ama, 590 F.3d 866, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (in which Judge Brown concurs in her
own opinion to say that the "court-driven" process is problematic and that these
questions are "best faced directly" by Congress); Chisun Lee, Judges Urge Congress
To Act on Indefinite Terrorism Detentions, PRO PUBLICA, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.propublica.org/feature/judges-urge-congress-to-act-on-indefinite
-terrorism-detentions-122 (three D.C. district judges calling on Congress to act).
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tempted to detonate an explosive on a commercial plane on December 25, 2009,
to be afforded the same treatment as the Guantdinamo detainees. Despite the
Obama Administration's principled intention to try him in a criminal court, it
simultaneously has been engaged in crafting a common law that might well
permit his indefinite detention under the AUMF-and almost certainly would
if the plane had landed anywhere outside the United States.' In other words,
the D.C. decisions, while perhaps reasonable as applied to a dwindling popula-
tion of those already detained, have created and continue to create a "loaded
weapon"" by laying the foundation for an entire preventive detention regime.
Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit made this weapon somewhat stronger in its
recent Al-Bihani ruling. Because AI-Bihani had conceded so many key facts, the
court simply could have decided whether detaining someone who served as a
cook for a military unit supporting the Taliban constituted the use of "necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons" that
"planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons."53 Since Al-
Bihani actually admitted to carrying a Taliban-issued weapon in the zone of
conflict, his case could have been closely analogized to Hamdi, without the
court having to evaluate the government's broader detention claims. Instead,
the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion that: (I) broadly dismissed international law
regarding detention authority; (2) endorsed the Obama Administration's gen-
eral position on detention; (3) went further by importing language from the
Military Commissions Act to cover all unlawful belligerents; and (4) sketched a
broad framework of deference to truncated procedural rules.
5 4
CONCLUSION
Even if Al-Bihani remains good law, future panels of the D.C. Circuit (and
potentially Supreme Court Justices) ought to take as minimalist an approach
toward these habeas cases as possible. They should cabin them to include only
51. The key difference in Abdulmutallab's case, of course, is that he was apprehended
within the United States. Attorney General Holder has made much of this distinc-
tion, writing in a letter addressed to Senator Mitch McConnell that "law of war
custody" for persons apprehended domestically has "raised serious statutory and
constitutional questions." See Letter from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder, to Senator
Mitch McConnell 3 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/ag-
letter-2-3-io.pdf. Nonetheless, the Obama Administration has maintained in its
habeas filings that AUMF authority should not be limited to individuals captured
in Afghanistan, and the Administration does not specifically except the territorial
United States from its global claim. See Government Memorandum, supra note 17,
at 7.
52. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, I., dissenting).
53. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 15 Stat. 224,
224 (2001).
54. See supra Section I.B.
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the current Guantinamo population, or only persons captured abroad, or only
persons captured by military as opposed to civilian forces. Whatever lines are
drawn, a ruling that emphasizes the specific facts before the court and avoids
sweeping declarations will head off a judicial endorsement of a more lasting
"national security court." The courts need not reverse earlier interpretations of
the AUMF, but they should avoid ratifying them. Instead, they ought to take the
Supreme Court's cue in Hamdi and rule narrowly on the cases at hand-all of
which are likely to involve people who were captured in Afghanistan or border-
ing conflict zones in Pakistan and who have been detained in GuantAnamo for
several years. This would, of course, prolong any firm resolution of the issue.
But it likely would force the hand of the political branches to erect a democrati-
cally generated solution, while avoiding the creation of an unprecedented legal
regime that may last long after Guantinamo has shut its doors.

